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The Birth of Preconception Torts
in Missouri
Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic1
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "'preconceptiontort' refers to negligent conduct which occurred
prior to the plaintiffs conception."2 Every jurisdiction permits a child born
alive to maintain a cause of action for prenatal injuries However, "[a]
perplexing problem that remains in this area is whether claims should be
permitted where the harmful contact with the mother occurs even before the
child is conceived... ."' In Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic,5 the Missouri
Supreme Court found such a claim to constitute a valid cause of action in
Missouri.6
This Note examines the legal development of preconception tort doctrine
with particular focus on the foreseeability, statute of limitations, and policy
issues flowing from the duty a defendant owes to an unborn plaintiff.'
1. 866 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1993).
2. Id. at 853 (footnote omitted).
3. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TBE LAW OF TORTS § 55,
at 368 (5th ed. 1984). A prenatal injury occurs when harm to a pregnant woman
results in injury to her later bom child. Id. at 367.
4. Id. at 369.
5. 866 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1993).
6. Id. at 854.
7. As Judge Holstein noted, the term "preconception tort" is something of a
misnomer. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 853 n.1. Tort recovery requires negligent conduct
that produces an injury to the plaintiff. The injury in preconception tort cases actually
occurs after conception. Id.
Preconception torts must be distinguished from other torts falling under the broad
category of prenatal injuries. See KETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 55, at 367-73.
Generally, the cases divide along two lines: (1) tortious injuries to the mother that
cause harm to the child, and (2) acts or omissions by the defendant that cause an
unwanted child to be born. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 55, at 367. The latter
category includes the torts of wrongful birth, wrongful life, and wrongful pregnancy.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 55, at 370. Missouri does not recognize a cause of
action for either wrongful life or wrongful birth. Wilsonv. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741,
746 (Mo.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 893 (1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.130 (1986).
However, Missouri courts recognize a claim for wrongful pregnancy as a form of
medical malpractice. Girdley v. Coats, 825 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Mo. 1992); Miller v.
Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). This Note focuses on the former
1
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
During her first pregnancy in 1984, Sandra Lough received prenatal care
from Dr. Fortin and Dr. White at the Rolla Women's Clinic in Rolla,
Missouri.' As part of that care, the clinic sent a blood sample to the Phelps
County Regional Medical Center for analysis.' Test results showed that Mrs.
Lough's Rh factor was negative, however, the lab technician misrecorded it
as Rh positive.'
Justin Lough was born later that year with Rh positive blood." During
Justin's delivery, Mrs. Lough's immune system became sensitized to Rh
positive blood and began to develop antibodies to attack future invasion.12
Because of the error in recording Mrs. Lough's Rh factor, her doctors failed
to administer RhoGAM, a drug designed to counter the adverse reaction to
Justin's Rh positive blood. 3
category of cases, specifically those cases resulting from harm to the mother prior to
conception of the later born injured child.
Furthermore, it is important to distinguishbetween a prenatal injury claim where
but for the defendant's negligence the child would have been born healthy, and a
wrongful life claim where the child had no chance to be born healthy. In the wrongful
life case, but for the negligent conduct, the child would not have come into existence
and would never have been born. Many courts deny such claims because of the
necessity of measuring the value of existence in an impaired condition against the
value of a right to never have existed. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp.,
512 N.E.2d 691, 697-98 (111. 1987) (distinguishing a wrongful life claim from the
preconception tort cause of action in Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250
(111. 1977)). See infranotes 3 9-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Renslow.
8. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 852.
9. Id.
10. Id. The presence of the D red blood cell antigen in a patient's blood is the
major cause of Rh factor incompatibility. Those who do not possess the D antigen are
said to be Rh negative, while those with the antigen are Rh positive. RAMzI S.
COTRAN ET AL., ROBBiNS PATHOLOGIC BASIs OF DIsEASE 527 (4th ed. 1989). Rh
factor incompatibility may produce erythroblastosis fetalis, the condition suffered by
the plaintiff, Tyler Lough. Id. See infra note 16 for a discussion of this condition.
11. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 852.
12. Id.
13. "Administered within 72 hours of a woman giving birth to a child with an Rh
factor different from hers, RhoGAM suppressesthe mother's immune systemresponse,
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Mrs. Lough became pregnant with Tyler in 1986.14 Like Justin, Tyler's
blood was Rh positive.15  Throughout her pregnancy, the antibodies
developed to fight Rh positive blood attacked Tyler's system and he developed
a condition known as erythroblastosis fetalis ("EBF")."6 The condition
produced "devastating pulmonary, cardiovascular and neurological damage,"1 7
and "Tyler Lough was born with multiple, irreversible, profound
disabilities.""8
Tyler sued based on the negligent conduct of the lab technician in
misrecording Mrs. Lough's Rh factor." The trial court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding no cognizable cause of
action for preconception torts under Missouri law."
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District reversed the decision,
concluding that Missouri would recognize a cause of action for preconception
torts.2" The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer to consider this issue
14. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 852.
15. Id.
16. Id. "[E]rythroblastosis fetalis may be defined as a hemolytic disease in the
newborn caused by blood-group incompatibility between the mother and the child."
CoTRAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 527. During delivery or abortion of a prior child
(or by the mistaken transfusion of Rh positive blood), the mother is exposed to the
antigens in the Rh positive blood of the child. Thereafter, her blood becomes
sensitizedto the antigens, developing antibodies that attack Rhpositive red blood cells.
When a subsequent fetus inherits Rh positive blood from the father, the
antibodies in the mother's sensitized Rh negative blood will cross the placenta and
destroy the red blood cells of the fetus. Depending on the severity of erythroblastosis
fetalis, the infant may be stillborn, suffer complications, or recover fully. CoTRAN ET
AL., supranote 10, at 527-29. In the vast majority of cases, an anti-D immunoglobulin
(such as RhoGAM) administered to the Rh negative mother within 72 hours of
delivery of each Rh positive child will prevent the mother's immune system from
becoming sensitized and developing antibodies that attack the red blood cells of a
future fetus. COTRAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 529; see Lough, 866 S.W.2d at
852-53.
17. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 852.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 853. Carolyn Lough, Tyler's guardian and conservator, brought the suit
in his behalf. The named defendants included Dr. White, Dr. Fortin, Rolla Women's
Clinic, Inc., the lab technician Kathy Jadwin, Dr. Brannemann, Dr. Wiench, Dr.
Goyette, and Pathology Lab Consultants, Inc. The complaint alleged that Jadwin, an
employee of the Phelps County Regional Medical Center, was an agent of Dr.
Brannemann, Dr. Wiench, Dr. Goyette, and Pathology Lab Consultants, Inc. Id.
20. Id. at 852.
21. Id. The unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals is Lough v. Rolla
Women's Clinic, Inc., No. 18163, 1993 WL 43887 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1993).
1994]
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of first impression.22 After thoroughly reviewing the cases from other
jurisdictions,' the court addressed the fundamental issue of whether the
defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff when the negligent conduct occurred
prior to conception.24 The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings." The court
held that preconception torts may be actionable in Missouri," a duty existed
under the facts of this case,27 and the Missouri medical malpractice statute
of limitations did not bar recovery.
2 8
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Development of Preconception Tort Doctrine
"For wherever the common law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it
also gives a remedy by action; and, therefore, wherever a new injury is done,
a new method of remedy must be pursued." '29 However, the common law
recognized no duty to an unborn plaintiff and refused to allow recovery for
prenatal injuries."0 Refusing to follow the doctrine set forth by Justice
Holmes in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,3 the court in Bonbrest
v. KotzY began "a rather spectacular reversal of the no duty rule."33 Today,
all jurisdictions allow a later-born child to state a claim for prenatal injuries. 4
22. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 852; see Mo. R. CIv. P. 83.03.
23. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 853-54.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 856.
26. Id. at 854.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 855-56.
29. 3 WLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *123.
30. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884); Allaire v.
St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638, 639-40 (111. 1900). The dissent in Allaire strongly
criticized the decision and began the move toward recognition of prenatal injuries. Id.
at 640-42 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
31. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
32. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). In reversing the existing trend, the Bonbrest
court noted that "the common law is not an arid and sterile thing, and it is anything
but static and inert." Id. at 142.
33. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 55, at 368.
34. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 55, at 368. An issue that remains unsettled
is whether the fetus must be viable at the time of the negligent conduct in order to
state a cognizable claim for prenatal injury. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 55, at
367-70. See, e.g., the Missouri cases considering this issue in the context of wrongful
death, including: Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1990); Connor v. Monkem
1000 [Vol. 59
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Relying on the early prenatal tort cases, the first cases to consider claims
for preconception torts refused to recognize a cause of action." Then, in a
1973 products liability action, the Tenth Circuit rejected prior reasoning and
allowed a cause of action for preconception injury to stand.36 Stating, "we
are persuaded that the Oklahoma courts would treat the problem of the injuries
alleged here as one of causation and proximate cause, to be determined by
competent medical proof,"37 the court remanded the case to the district court
for further proceedings.38
Co., No. 64884, 1994 WL 493561 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1994), transferredto Mo.
Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 1994. See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205 (Supp. 1994) (stating that
life begins at conception).
For additional information regarding the history and development of prenatal and
preconception tort doctrine, see, e.g., McAuley v. Wills, 303 S.E.2d 258, 259-60 (Ga.
1983); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1251-53 (Ill. 1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supranote 3, § 55,
at 367-70; Elizabeth F. Collins, An Overview and Analysis: Prenatal Torts,
Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Death, and Wrongful Birth: Time for
a New Framework, 22 J. FAM. L. 677, 678-86 (1984); Deborah K. Andrews,
Comment, Recognizing a Cause ofAction for Preconception Torts in Light ofMedical
and LegalAdvancementsRegarding the Unborn, 53 UMKC L. REv. 78, 80-93 (1984);
Marisa L. Mascaro, Note, Preconception Tort Liability: Recognizing a Strict Liability
Cause of Action for DES Grandchildren, 17 AM. 3. L. & MED. 435, 437-46 (1991);
Vik Ed Stoll, Note, Preconception Tort-The Needfor a Limitation, 44 Mo. L. REv.
143, 143-45 (1979); Ronald F. Chase, Annotation, Liabilityfor Prenatal Injuries, 40
A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971); Annotation, Liability for Child's Personal Injuries or Death
Resulting from Tort CommittedAgainst Child's Mother Before Child was Conceived,
91 A.L.R.3d 316 (1979).
35. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D.N.J. 1956)
(Federal Tort Claims Act case applying Pennsylvania law). The Morgan court relied
on Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 16 A.2d 28, 28 (Pa. 1940). The Berlin court noted that
"[a]t early common law the mother and child until birth were considered as one, the
child was not deemed to have an existence independent of the parent." Id. Looking
to decisions such as Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17, short of legislative action, the court
refused to establish a cause of action for prenatal torts. Berlin, 16 A.2d at 28.
36. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Lab., 483 F.2d 237, 241 (10th Cir. 1973)
(construing Oklahoma law). The strict liability claim arose when the plaintiffs alleged
that birth control pills taken prior to the mother's pregnancy altered the chromosome
structure in her body. After she ceased taking the pills, she gave birth to Mongoloid
twins. In an action for the surviving twin, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's
birth control pills caused the deformity. Id. at 238-39.
37. Id. at 240.
38. Id. at 241.
1994] 1001
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The issue reached the Illinois Supreme Court in Renslow v. Mennonite
Hospital,39 a case involving the negligent transfusion of Rh positive blood
which sensitized the mother's Rh negative blood and injured the later
conceived plaintiff.4" The trial court dismissed the claim because the
plaintiff was not "at the time of the alleged infliction of the injury
conceived."4 The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that the plaintiff was
not a separate entity to whom the defendant owed a traditional duty of care
at the time of the negligent conduct.42 However, the plaintiff asked the court
to find a "contingent prospective duty to a child not yet conceived but
foreseeably harmed by a breach of duty to the child's mother."'"
Acknowledging that duty is essentially an expression of policy interests,44 the
court concluded that "[l]ogic and sound policy require a finding of legal duty
in this case."45 "[T]here is a right to be born free from prenatal injuries
foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the child's mother."" In light of
substantial medical advances that can mitigate or prevent harm to an unborn
child, "sound social policy requires the extension of duty in this case."47 The
court conceded that few prior cases reached the same result, but noted several
courts and commentators had argued existence is not a prerequisite to finding
a legal duty at the time of a wrongful act.4"
Finally, the court addressed the defendants' concern that allowing a
preconception tort cause of action would lead to perpetual liability across
several generations.49 The defendants offered the example of a nuclear
accident causing genetic damage to an ancestor and resulting in successive
generations of plaintiffs suing a single defendant."0 The court distinguished
the defendants' hypothetical situation from the facts in Renslow, noting the
damage was not self-perpetuating and the defendant was not a remote
descendant of the person harmed by the negligent act.51  The court
39. 367 N.E.2d 1250 (111. 1977).
40. Id. at 1251. See supra note 16 for a discussion of this condition.
41. Id. at 1251 (quoting trial court).
42. Id. at 1254.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1255.
46. Id.
47. Id. Because the duty established by the court extended to a new class of
plaintiffs, the court gave the rule prospective application, applying only to the Renslow
plaintiff and future conduct. Id. at 1256.
48. Id. at 1255-56.





Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/6
PRECONCEPThON TORTS
concluded, "[w]e feel confident that when such a case is presented, the
judiciary will effectively exercise its traditional role of drawing rational
distinctions, consonant with current perceptions of justice, between harms
which are compensable and those which are not."52
The acceptability of a preconception tort cause of action reached the
Eighth Circuit in Bergstreser v. Mitchell, a diversity action requiring
interpretation of Missouri law. 3 The case arose when the defendants were
alleged to have negligently performed a caesarean section during a prior
pregnancy.54 As a result, the mother's uterus ruptured during her later
pregnancy with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was injured during an emergency
caesarean delivery.5 Similar to the defendants in Lough, the defendants
argued Missouri would not recognize a cause of action for preconception torts
and the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.56 The court found a
cause of action for preconception torts consistent with Missouri prenatal tort
doctrine and the few cases that had previously considered the issue. 7
Furthermore, the Missouri two year statute of limitations and its tolling
provision for minors began to run when the plaintiff came into being and not
at the time of the negligent conduct.5" As the plaintiff filed his claim within
52. Id.
53. 577 F.2d 22, 23-24 (8th Cir. 1978) (construing Missouri law). The case
reached the court on interlocutory appeal of a controlling question of law where there
is substantial ground for difference in opinion. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988). The court
characterized the case as "an unusual and novel [question of law] upon which few
courts have had an opportunity to express any opinion whatsoever." Bergstreser,577
F.2d at 23-24.
54. Bergstreser,577 F.2d at 24.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 25.
57. Id. The court citedJorgensen(see supranotes 36-38 and accompanying text),
Renslow (see supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text), and Park v. Chessin, 387
N.Y.S.2d 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). Subsequently, Parkwas overruled by Albala v.
City of New York, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (N.Y. 1981) and the New York line of cases
refusing to recognize a preconception tort cause of action. See infra notes 104-25 and
accompanying text.
Also, the court noted the overwhelmingly favorable trend among commentators
in favor of a cause of action recognizing preconception torts. Bergstreser,577 F.2d
at 25 n.4 (citing twelve sources addressing the subject).
58. Bergstreser, 577 F.2d at 26. The defendants argued that the statute should
begin to run at the time of the negligent conduct. However, since the plaintiff did not
exist at the time of the negligence, the tolling provision for minors was inapplicable.
Id.
The court did not decide whether the statute of limitations in effect at the time
of the negligent act (Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.140 (1969) or the revised medical
1994] 1003
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the grace period associated with the tolling provision of the statute, his claim
was not barred under Missouri law.59
Eleven years after the decision in Renslow, a Michigan plaintiff brought
an action alleging that the defendants' failure to test and immunize her mother
for rubella prior to pregnancy resulted in rubella related injury to the
plaintiff.6" The court defined the issue as "whether or not a child, when born
alive, has a cause of action for injury arising out of preconception negligent
conduct,"6 1 in other words, "[w]hether there was a duty under these
circumstances to a plaintiff who was not in being at the time of a wrongful
act."'62 The court concluded that "[i]t is readily foreseeable that someone not
immunized may catch rubella and, if pregnant, bear a child suffering from
rubella syndrome."'63 Because the immunization and test were designed
specificallyto prevent rubella syndrome in later born children, the court found
the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.' Thus, a cause of action
for preconception injury was found to exist.65
The dissent voiced concern about potential liability that might extend
across several generations to the original defendant.66 Furthermore, as
discussed in Albala v. City of New York,6' recognizing a cause of action may
make physicians practice defensive medicine, forcing them to choose whether
to administer treatment to save a mother's life, considering the treatment
might one day harm a future born child.6" The dissent viewed this as
extending "traditional tort concepts beyond reasonable bounds." '69 Therefore,
the dissent concluded the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff."0
malpractice statute of limitations (Mo. Rav. STAT. § 516.105 (Supp. 1976) applied to
the case. Bergstreser,577 F.2d at 26. The court stated the result would be the same
regardless which statute applied. Id.
59. Id.
60. Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
61. Id. (quoting the Michigan trial court).
62. Id. at 368-69 (quoting Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1269 (Dooley, J., concurring)).
63. Id. at 369.
64. Id. at 369-70.
65. Id. at 369.
66. Id. at 371 (MacKenzie, Presiding J., dissenting). For example, negligent
conduct altering a young girl's chromosome structure and passed to successive
generations might result in a suit by the girl's granddaughter eighty-one years after the
negligent conduct. Id.
67. 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (N.Y. 1981); see infra notes 104-25 and accompanying
text.
68. Monusko, 437 N.W.2d at 371-72 (MacKenzie, Presiding J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 372 (MacKenzie, Presiding J., dissenting).
70. Id.
1004 [Vol. 5 9
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Following the logic of Albala, the Indiana Third District Court of
Appeals declined to recognize a cause of action for preconception torts in
Walker v. Rinck."1 Walker involved negligent typing of the mother's blood
and the failure to administer RhoGAM following the birth of an older
child. 2
On facts which for legally relevant purposes were indistinguishable from
Walker, the Indiana First District Court of Appeals in Yeager v. Bloomington
Obstetrics and Gynecology, Inc. refused to follow the majority holding in
Walker.1 3 Instead, the court adopted the view of the dissent in Walker,
calling for the adoption of a cause of action for negligent preconception
injuries.14 The court reversed the decision of the trial court and found the
plaintiff's complaint sufficient to state a cognizable claim. 5
In order to resolve the conflict between the circuits, the Indiana Supreme
Court granted transfer of the Walker case. 6 The court concluded the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff because Mrs. Walker's health would not
be affected by receiving RhoGAM, a treatment designed to protect future
fetuses from injuries in utero.11 Potential harm to future conceived children
was readily foreseeable and no potential conflict existed between helping the
mother with a treatment that might harm a later conceived child. 8 "[A]n
analysis of duty based upon relationship, foreseeability and public policy
compels the conclusion that [the defendant] owed a duty to the [plaintiff
children] to use reasonable care concerning the administration of RhoGAM to
their mother."7
9
The court concluded that the parents' knowledge of the risks associated
with having future children was not an intervening, superseding cause
71. 566 N.E.2d 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), vacated, 604 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. 1992).
72. Id. at 1088-89.
73. 585 N.E.2d 696, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
74. Id. at 699 (adopting by reference the analysis in Walker, 566 N.E.2d at 1090
(Stanton, J., dissenting)).
75. Id. at 700.
76. Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Ind. 1992).
77. Id. at 595.
78. Id.
79. Id. The questions of whether the defendants breached their duty of care and
whether their breach was the proximate cause of the injury are issues of fact to be
decided at trial. Id.
See also Empire Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d
1191, 1192-93 (Colo. 1988) (allocating losses among insurance companies). The case
involved a child who developed EBF as a result of a physician mistyping the mother's
blood during an earlier pregnancy. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the
claim was valid under ordinary prenatal tort principles, and it was not a wrongful life
cause of action. Id. at 1196-97.
1994] 1005
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absolving the defendants of liability." To break the causal chain, an
intervening, superseding cause must not be foreseeable at the time of the
tortious act.81 It was foreseeable at the time of the defendant's negligent
failure to administer RhoGAM that the mother might become pregnant again
in the future." "Because this course of events was foreseeable at the time
of the alleged negligent acts, it cannot be an intervening, superseding cause
of the ... children's alleged injuries."8'
Finally, the court noted the plaintiff's claim was not barred by the
Indiana statute of limitations.' While recognizing that the statute might
allow a child to bring an action against a physician who failed to properly
administer RhoGAM many years before, the court noted that it must follow
the statute of limitations set forth by the legislature.' The court pointed out
that the legislature has the power to amend the statute of limitations to limit
potential liability.86 However, the potential flood of litigation resulting from




84. Id. The statute required that an action against a health care provider be filed
within two years of the negligent act. However, a tolling provision allowed minors
under the age of six to file any time before turning eight. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Following recognition of preconception torts by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Renslow, the Illinois legislature amended the statute of limitations to require
that a claim must be brought within eight years of the incident. Id. at 596 n.2. The
current statute reads:
§ 13-212. Physician or hospital.
(b) Except as provided in Section 13-215 of this Act, no action for
damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse
or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon
tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be
brought more than 8 years after the date on which occurred the act or
omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of
such injury or death where the person entitled to bring the action was, at
the time the cause of action accrued, under the age of 18 years; provided,
however, that in no event may the cause of action be brought after the
person's 22nd birthday. If the person was under the age of 18 years when
the cause of action accrued and, as a result of this amendatory Act of 1987,
the action is either barred or there remains less than 3 years to bring such
action, then he or she may bring the action within 3 years of July 20,
1987 ....
735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-212 (Smith-Hurd 1991).
1006 [Vol. 59
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suits by second and third generation plaintiffs had not materialized in other
jurisdictions.8 7
While recognizing the existence of a cause of action for preconception
torts, other courts have found the plaintiff s injury, on the facts of a particular
case, to be too remote to recognize a duty of care.
For example, in McAuley v. Wills,' the mother brought a wrongful
death action for the death of her infant child.89 Prior to conception she
suffered injuries in an automobile accident and became a paraplegic."0
Subsequently she married and gave birth to a child. Because of the mother's
paraplegia, the infant was unable to pass properly through the fetal course and
died from cardiac arrest.91 Shortly afterwards, the mother sued the driver of
the car for preconception negligence. 2 The court held that "at least in some
situations, a person should be under a duty of care toward an unconceived
child."93 However, the injuries resulting to the child were too remote to hold
the driver responsible for the child's death.94
The mother in Hegyes v. Unjian Enter., Inc.9" was involved in an
automobile accident with the defendant, and as a result, she was fitted with a
medical device called a lumbo-peritoneal shunt.96 The mother later became
pregnant, and the baby was delivered prematurely to avoid injury to the
mother (not the infant) caused by the fetus pressing against the shunt.9 Like
other California courts, the court failed to distinguish wrongful life claims
from other types of preconception tort claims. Instead, all "claims brought by
infants for negligence occurring prior to their conception" are treated as claims
87. Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 597. The dissent disagreed, anticipating a long liability
tail extending into the third generation following some medical treatments that might
be administered. Id. (Shepard, C.J., dissenting).
88. 303 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. 1983).




93. Id. at 260.
94. Id. The court noted that if the accident left the mother "wholly unable to give
birth to a child," damages would be recoverable by her in a personal injury action
against the driver. If the mother was not "wholly unable to give birth to a child," the
failure to properly deliver the child considering the mother's paraplegia constituted an
"intervening act not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the car crash." Id.
95. 286 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
96. Id. at 86.
97. Id. The plaintiff child claimed no injury in utero, only those injuries resulting
from premature delivery 51 days prior to term. Id. at 86 n.2.
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for wrongful life.98 "California does recognize the existence of a cause of
action for damages sustained as a result of a defendant's preconception
negligence. However, case law imposes liability only where there is a 'special
relationship' between the defendant and the mother giving rise to a duty to the
minor plaintiff."99  Liability is found where the defendant's conduct is
"inextricably related to the inevitable future pregnancy. . . ."" The court
found that no special relationship exists between a motorist and a child
conceived several years after the mother's involvement in an accident with
that motorist.'O" Deeply concerned about the ability to draw lines short of
unlimited duty,"° the court found that a motorist owes no duty to the child
and is not liable for injuries suffered by the child." 3
New York has steadfastly refused to recognize a cause of action for
preconception injury. In Albala v. City of New York,' 4 the New York Court
of Appeals declined to allow recoverybased on policy grounds, stating, "[w]e
are of the opinion that the recognition of a cause of action under these
circumstances would require the extension of traditional tort concepts beyond
manageable bounds .... "'0 The court began by distinguishing
preconception torts from prenatal torts, noting that with a prenatal tort "there
are two identifiable beings [the mother and the fetus] within the zone of
danger each of whom is owed a duty independent of the other and each of
whom may be directly injured."'0 6  Next, the court distinguished the
preconception tort claim from a claim for wrongful life. 7
Addressing the question of duty, the court expressed its concern about the
limits of potential liability, noting that "foreseeability alone is not the hallmark
98. Id. at 89 (citing Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982)). But see supra
note 7.
99. Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 93.
102. Id. at 97.
103. Id. at 101.
104. 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (N.Y. 1981). The case involved a mother whose uterus
was perforated during a prior abortion, allegedly resulting in brain damage to the
plaintiff born over four years after the negligent abortion. Id. at 109.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1951)).
107. Id. (citing Park v. Chessin, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (N.Y. 1978)). In Park
the court found that a cause of action for "wrongful life demands a calculation of
damages dependent upon comparison between the Hobson's choice of life in an
impaired state and nonexistence. This comparison the law is not equipped to make."
413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. In Albala, if the mother's uterus had not been previously
perforated, the child would have been born healthy. 445 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
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of legal duty for if foreseeability were the sole test we could not logically
confine the extension of liability."108
Finally, the court suggested that recognition of the tort might lead to the
practice of defensive medicine.0 9 Concluding that the law cannot provide
a remedy for every harm, the court found that the balance of policy interests
weighed in favor of rejecting the plaintiff's preconception tort claim."'
Catherwoodv. American Sterilizer Co., another New York case, involved
a mother exposed to chemicals while employed by the defendant."' After
the last exposure, the plaintiff was born with chromosomal damage." 2
Following Albala, the court dismissed the negligence action and considered
the applicability of the Albala holding to claims outside of negligence." 3
The court noted that the Albala decision involved determinations based on
public policy."4 The plaintiffs injuries were "foreseeable, causally related
and resulted in ascertainable damages.""' However, "[t]he decision was the
exercise of the court's duty to limit liability where policy so demanded.""' 6
Based on this precedent, the court found recognizing a duty in a products
liability action inconsistent with the policies of the New York Court of
Appeals and declined to allow the plaintiff's cause of action."'
108. Albala, 445 N.Y.2d at 110 (citations omitted). The court used an example
of a mother whose uterus was punctured in an auto accident instead of by a physician.
Since the result is the same in both cases, why would the driver of the automobile not
also be liable for causing the injury? Id.
109. Id.
A physician faced with the alternative of saving a patient's life by
administering a treatment involving the possibility of adverse consequences
to later conceived offspring of that patient would, if exposed to liability of
the magnitude considered in this case, undoubtedly be inclined to advise
against the treatment rather than risk the possibility of having to
recompense a child born with a handicap. Accordingly, society as a whole
would bear the cost of our placing physicians in a direct conflict between
their moral duty to patients and the proposed legal duty to those
hypothetical future generations outside the immediate zone of danger.
Id.
110. Id. at 110-11.
111. 498N.Y.S.2d703,704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), af'd, 511N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987).
112. Id.




117. Id. at 706.
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The New York Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of the Albala
holding in a products liability context in Enright v. Eli Lilly and Co."8 The
case involved the question of whether liability of diethylstilbestrol ("DES")
manufacturers should extend to third generation plaintiffs." 9 Recognizing
courts and the legislature have often expressed concern for DES cases and
their unique problems of proof,2 ' the court declined to adopt a cause of
action not available in other cases simply because this case involved DES. 2'
Enright differed from Albala only because the mother suffered injury from
DES exposure instead of medical malpractice. 22 While the manufacturer
is in a better position to pay for the losses associated with defective products,
the same issues present in Albala exist in a products liability case."
Reasserting its position in Albala, the court noted that recognition of a cause
of action "could not be confined without the drawing of artificial and arbitrary
boundaries. For all we know, the rippling effects of DES exposure may
extend for generations. It is our duty to confine liability within manageable
limits." '24 Thus, the court concluded, "the distinctions between this case and
Albala provide no basis for a departure from the rule that an injury to a
mother which results in injuries to a later-conceived child does not establish




118. 568 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y. 1991).
119. Id. at 551. DES is a synthetic estrogen manufactured by approximately 300
companies and distributed to pregnant women between 1947 and 1971 to prevent
miscarriage. The Food and Drug Administration banned the drug in 1971 after studies
showedthat inutero exposure might result inrare forms of vaginal and cervical cancer
among teen-age women. Id. at 552.
In Enright, the plaintiff alleged that the grandmother took DES, causing in utero
exposure to the mother, thus injuring the mother's reproductive system. Subsequently
this injury led to the premature birth of the plaintiff in an injured condition. Id. at
551.
120. Id. at 552-53.
121. Id. at 553.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 554-55.
124. Id. at 555.
125. Id. at 556. The Supreme Court of Ohio reached the same conclusion in
Grover v. Eli. Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696, 700-01 (Ohio 1992). The court found
that the plaintiff's injuries were not a result of direct exposure to DES but from the
mother's in utero exposure to the drug ingested by the grandmother. Because of
"remoteness in time and causation" the court held that the plaintiff did not have an
independent cause of action against the DES manufacturers. "A pharmaceutical
company's liability for the distribution or manufacture of a defective prescription drug
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B. Statute of Limitations
Prompted by a concern for stale claims after the decision in Renslow, the
Illinois legislature modified the statute of limitations applying to preconception
tort cases to provide that a claim must be filed within eight years of the
negligent act." 6 As in Lough, the statute of limitations argument is often
raised in the context of preconception tort cases.
127
For example, in an EBF case where a physician failed to administer
RhoGAM after a prior delivery, the Arizona Court of Appeals thoroughly
reviewed the application of the statute of limitations in the context of a
wrongful death action brought by the child's mother.22 The court
concluded the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of injury.
However, in some cases the injury does not occur at the time of the medical
malpractice. 2 9  In a case involving administration of RhoGAM, if the
mother decides not to have a any more later born children, then no injury ever
occurs. 3 ' Only when she becomes pregnant with a subsequent Rh positive
child will injury actually occur.' Thus, the court concluded that injury
actually occurred at the moment of conception, and not the moment of birth
of the later child.112  Since no injury could occur until the mother either
conceived or gave birth to the second child, the action was filed within the
three year statute of limitations period.'
Like many states, Missouri revised its statute of limitations for medical
malpractice actions as a response to the perceived medical malpractice
crisis.' The current statute provides that a claim against health care
126. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-212(b) (Smith-Hurd 1991). Seesupranote
86 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Bergstreser,577 F.2d at 26; Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 596-97.
128. Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 1016, 1017-20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). The
statute of limitations provided that an action filed on behalf of a minor under the age
of seven would begin to run the earlier of the minor's seventh birthday or at death.
The cause of action must then be filed within three years. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-564 (1992); Kenyon, 688 P.2d at 1017.
129. Kenyon, 688 P.2d at 1019.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. The court stated this in dicta, as it was not necessary to the decision in
the case. Regardless of whether injury occurred at the moment of conception or at the
birth of the second child, the action was within the three year statute of limitations.
Id.
133. Id. at 1019-20.
134. Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Mo. 1986) (quoting Thea
Andrews, Comment, Infant Tolling Statutes in Medical Malpractice Cases: State
Constitutional Challenges, 5 J. LEGAL MEDICINE 469, 486 (1984)).
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providers must be brought within two years of the date of the negligent
act,13 except a minor under ten years old has until the twelfth birthday to
bring the claim. 36 However, in Strahler v. St. Luke's Hospital, the Missouri
Supreme Court found the exception requiring that an action be brought within
two years of a minor's tenth birthday violates a minor's right to seek remedy
in the courts under Article I, Section 14 of the Missouri Constitution.137
'While such provisions no doubt go some distance in alleviating the
problems of malpractice insurers and health care providers, they do so only
at a high cost. Their effect is to bar the malpractice suits of minors without
regard to the validity of their claims or the fact that the minors are wholly
innocent in failing to timely pursue their claims. Such a result seems to
unfairly penalize the blameless minor in order to protect the potentially
negligent health care provider.'
Id. See also James Bartimus et al., Protecting Plaintiff's Rights in the Medical
Malpractice "Crisis," 53 UMKC L. REV. 27, 32-37 (1984).
For a discussion of the history and development of the Missouri medical
malpractice statute of limitations, see Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 311-13
(Mo. 1968); Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 856-58 (Smith, Special J., dissenting).
135. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.105 (1986). The statute reads in full:
516.105. Actions against health care providers (medical malpractice)
All actions againstphysicians, hospitals, dentists, registered or licensed
practical nurses, optometrists, podiatrists, pharmacists, chiropractors,
professional physical therapists, and any other entity providing health care
services and all employees of any of the foregoing acting in the course and
scope of their employment, for damages for malpractice, negligence, error
or mistake related to health care shall be brought within two years from the
date of occurrence of the act of neglect complained of, except that a minor
under the full age often years shall have until his twelfth birthday to bring
action, and except that in cases in which the act of neglect complained of
its introducing and negligently permitting any foreign object to remain
within the body of a living person, the action shall be brought within two
years from the date of the discovery of such alleged negligence, or from the
date on which the patient in the exercise of ordinary care should have
discovered such alleged negligence, whichever date first occurs, but in no
event shall any action for damages for malpractice, error, or mistake be
commenced after the expiration of ten years from the date of the act of
neglect complained of.
136. Id.
137. 706 S.W.2d at 11-12.
The statutory limitation period, as applied to minors, violates their
right of access to our courts under Mo. Const. art. I, § 14 and renders
vacant the guarantee contained in this constitutional provision which
declares in no uncertain terms "that the courts of justice shall be open to
every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person .... "
To the extent that it deprives minor medical malpractice claimants the right
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Thus, a minor plaintiff has at least until the age of majority to file a claim
under the expanded holding in Strahler."'
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
After setting forth the procedural posture of the case,'39 Judge Holstein
cited cases from other jurisdictions addressing the preconception tort
issue.' Judge Holstein noted that "every court addressing the specific issue
presented here has consistently allowed an action for recovery by a child born
with EBF following a defendant's failure to administer RhoGAM to an Rh
negative woman who has given birth to an Rh positive child."'' The court
then reviewed the holdings of the New York cases refusing to recognize a
preconception tort cause of action and referred to by Dean Prosser as a
"blanket no-duty rule."'4 Judge Holstein concluded it was speculation to
say that liability cannot be "confined to manageable boundaries if
preconception torts are permitted."'4 Furthermore, the possibility that a
to assert their own claims individually, makes them dependent on the
actions of others to assert their claims, and works a forfeiture of those
claims if not asserted within two years, the provisions of § 516.105 are too
severe an interference with a minors' state constitutionally enumerated right
of access to the courts to be justified by the state's interest in remedying a
perceived medical malpractice crisis.
Id. (footnote omitted).
138. See id.; Boleyv. Knowles, No. WD 47959, 1994 WL 256209, at *3 (Mo.
Ct. App. June 14, 1994), transferred to Mo. Sup. Ct. Sept. 20, 1994; Ventimiglia v.
Cutter Lab., 708 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), overruledby Speck v. Union
Elec. Co., 731 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1987).
Prior to adoption of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.105, the medical malpractice statute of
limitations required that an action be
'brought within two years from the date of the act of neglect complained
of .. .,' Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.140 (1969), unless the prospective plaintiff
was a minor, in which case the limitations period was tolled until the
plaintiff reached the age of twenty-one years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.170
(1969).
Bergstreser,577 F.2d at 26.
139. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 852-53.
140. Id. at 853.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing KEETON ET AL. supra note 3, § 55, at 369). See supra notes
104-25 and accompanying text for a review of the New York line of cases.
143. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 854.
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physician may be forced to choose a course of treatment less beneficial to the
mother to avoid harm to future children is not present in the facts of this
case.1 4  Allowing recovery in an EBF case does not lead a physician to
forego beneficial treatment to the mother.145
Next, the court employed a hypothetical situation to illustrate the holding
of the case.
The reason for not adopting a rule that would absolutely bar claims for
preconception torts is demonstrated by the following hypothetical: Assume
a balcony is negligently constructed. Two years later, a mother and her
one-year-old child step onto the balcony and it gives way, causing serious
injuries to both the mother and the child. It would be ludicrous to suggest
that only the mother would have a cause of action against the builder but,
because the infant was not conceived at the time of the negligent conduct,
no duty of care existed toward the child. It is unjust and arbitrary to deny
recovery to Tyler simply because he had not been conceived at the time of
Kathy Jadwin's negligence.146
Judge Holstein then turned to the question of whether a duty existed in
the case.'47 He concluded that each of the factors outlined in Hyde v. City
of Columbia4' favors a finding of duty in this case.14 9 The court stated:
144. Id.
145. Id. (citing Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 596). Similarly, the court concluded that
although Ohio and Georgia had not allowed recovery in the preconception tort cases
under review, both courts would likely recognize a cause of action "where there is no
intervening cause and the treatment of the mother is specifically designed to benefit
the later conceived child." Id.
146. Id. Determining when the injury occurred, the court in Martin v. St. John
Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 517 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (wrongful death
action on behalf of a fetus stillborn as a result of a negligent caesarean in a previous
pregnancy) cited this analogy with approval. The court offered an additional analogy:
For example, assume a party had his furnace repaired and the work was
defective so that the next heating season fumes are released killing a
newborn child. We would conclude that the injury occurred when the
fumes were released, not when the furnace was repaired. Nor would the
infant be denied a cause of action because it was not in existence at the
time of the negligent repair.
Id. at 789-90.
147. Id.
148. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
149. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 853. See infra note 175 outlining the policy factors
Missouri courts look to in assessing duty.
1014 [Vol. 59
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/6
PRECONCEPTION TORTS
Individual cases involving "preconception torts" can be sensibly analyzed
under existing principles of tort law to determine if a duty exists in a
particular case. Just as there is not a duty in every case when a plaintiff is
alive at the time of some allegedly negligent conduct, there will not be a
duty in every case where allegedly negligent conduct harms a plaintiff not
yet conceived. It is sufficient to say that in this case, a duty exists.15
Finally, the court focused on the medical malpractice statute of
limitations." Judge Holstein found the holdings of Walker and Bergstreser
highly persuasive on the question of whether Tyler Lough's preconception tort
claim should be barred.152 "[U]nder the terms of the statute," Tyler had
until he turns twelve to bring his cause of action.153 Furthermore, the
holding in Strahler expanded the two year limitation for minors.' Given
that Tyler was less than ten years old when the action was filed, his claim was
not barred by the statute of limitations. 55
Having concluded that Missouri would recognize a preconception tort
cause of action,'56 that a duty existed in this case,'57 and that the claim
was not barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations,"5 ' the court
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.'59
150. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 853.
151. Id. at 855. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
152. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 855. Analogous to Lough, both Walker and
Bergstreserinvolved situations where the plaintiff was conceived more than two years
after the negligent conduct. Id.
153. Id. The court stated:
While it is true that § 516.105 commences running of the two-year period
at the time of the negligent conduct rather than the time of the injury, the
statute, in equally clear and unequivocal terms, excludes actions by a minor
under ten years of age from the two-year limit. Under the terms of the
statute, Tyler, being under ten years of age, has until his twelfth birthday
to bring this action. To hold otherwise requires reading words into the
statute which are not there. Where no ambiguity exists, there is no room
for construction.
Id. (citing Jones v. Director of Revenue, 832 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Mo. 1992)).
154. Id. at 856. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
155. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 856.
156. Id. at 854.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 856.
159. Id. Judge Benton, Judge Thomas, and Judge Price concurred inthe majority
opinion of the Court. Judge Robertson did not participate in the decision.
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B. The Dissenting Opinion
Special Judge Smith began the dissenting opinion by concurring with the
majority's recognition of a preconception tort cause of action on the facts of
this case.16 However, the dissent diverted from the majority with regard to
whether the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's claim."'
Special Judge Smith first reviewed the history and development of the
Missouri medical malpractice statute of limitations," noting specifically that
"more than two years had elapsed between 'the date of occurrence of the act
of neglect complained of' and plaintiff's conception.""6 3 While the majority
concluded that the exception for minors should apply in this case, the dissent
disagreed."6 "The question not addressed by the majority is whether the
minor exception applies where no injured minor exists until more than two
years after the act of neglect." '65
Special Judge Smith then concluded that the exception for minors is a
disability exception intended to provide minors with an opportunity to bring
an action on their own behalf.166 Such a statute "must be viewed within the
160. Id. (Smith, Special J., dissenting) Judge Limbaugh and Chief Justice
Covington concurred in the dissenting opinion. The fact that the medical procedure
involved was specifically designed to benefit a later conceived child, and not a
procedure designed to benefit the mother which incidentally harms a later conceived
child was of particular importance in the dissent's recognition of a liability in
preconception tort cases. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 856-58 (Smith, Special J., dissenting). See also Laughlin v. Forgrave,
432 S.W.2d 308, 311-13 (Mo. 1968).
163. Id. at 858 (Smith, Special J., dissenting) (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 561.105
(1986)).
164. Id.
165. Id. Regarding this question, Special Judge Smith believed the statute was
ambiguous.
It could mean, as the majority holds, that the "minor exception" serves to
preserve a cause of action past the limitation period "in the air" until a
minor arrives to claim it. On the other hand it could mean that the "minor
exception" applies only to authorize a minor sustaining damage within the
two year limitation period an additional period of time determined by his
legal disability to bring the action.
Id.
166. Id. The dissent defined "disabilities" exceptions as those directed at persons
who are not legally authorized to pursue legal remedies on their own behalf.
"Disabilities" exceptions are contrasted with "impracticalities" exceptions which deal
with caseswhere parties are prevented from bringing action because of events beyond
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context of the legislative attempts to regulate the number and timeliness of
malpractice actions.""6 7
The dissent questioned the majority's reliance on Walker and Bergstreser
as persuasive authority, since both cases assumed that the exception for minors
in the statute of limitations applies regardless of the amount of time passing
between the negligent act and the plaintiff's conception.16 That assumption
is the fundamental difference between the majority and the dissent.
During the two year period after the occurrence plaintiff had not been
conceived and therefore could sustain no damage, and no cause of action
existed. He was not under any legal disability for disability connotes
existence, which plaintiff did not have. He incurred no legal disability until
after the time established in § 516.105 had passed. Prior to reaching a
status of disability the time specified in the statute had expired and with it
plaintiffs after arising cause of action.'69
The dissent concluded by noting the legislature had determined any injustice
to the plaintiff "is outweighed by the benefits to the public health and weal
from restriction of malpractice litigation."'10 The court must be bound by
that determination.'
V. COMMENT
Referring to Albala as a "thinly reasoned case" ruling "that a child has no
cause of action for preconception torts upon the mother," Prosser and Keeton
argue for a less restrictive approach:
The reasons for denying such claims involve the problems of proof and
proximate causation arising, for example, from the imposition of liability
167. Id. at 859 (Smith, Special J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Id. (citations and footnote omitted). The dissent continued:
It is presumptively possible, although admittedly remote, that, given the
number of years during which a woman is capable of child-bearing, the
cause of action here could be brought, under the majority reasoning, fifty
or more years after "the date of the occurrence of the act of neglect
complained of." I am unable to conclude that § 516.105 was intended by
the General Assembly to allow time frames of that magnitude. The plaintiff
was not the patient nor even the fetus of the patient at the time of the act
of neglect.
Id.
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upon a chemical, drug or power company for future generations of
genetically mutated children resulting from toxic chemicals or radioactive
waste. These are indeed staggering problems, that will have to be dealt
with carefully in future toxic tort contexts such as these, but they by no
means require that a blanket no-duty rule be applied in preconception injury
cases where such problems do not exist. 72
Others argue that preconception torts should be treated as any other
negligence claim, subject to the traditional tort requirements of duty, breach,
proximate cause, and damage without undue regard for the possibility of
perpetual liability."3 The fact that the court in Lough could find no cases
denying recovery to a plaintiff suffering from EBF indicates fundamental
policy analysis must focus on where to draw the liability line in more
speculative cases."'
As indicated by the court in Lough, it is clear that existing principles of
tort law may be used to determine whether a duty exists in a preconception
tort case such as Lough."' Little doubt exists as to the sound policy behind
allowing a cause of action where the defendant negligently failed to provide
172. KEETON, supra note 3, § 55, at 369.
173. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 34, at 97.
174. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 853.
175. Id. at 854.
Duty means that a party is required to act in a particular manner or risk being
subject to liability for injury to the person to whom the duty is owed. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965). "Any question of duty depends upon a calculus of
policy considerations." Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 854. "[D]uty is not sacrosanct in itself,
but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead
the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." KEETON, supra note 3, § 53,
at 358.
A relationship that the law recognizes as establishing a duty of care is essential
between the injured party and the party inflicting the injury. Hyde v. City of
Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Zuber v. Clarkson
Constr. Co., 251 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. 1952)). In Missouri, the existence of a duty is
determined by weighing several policy factors, including: "the social consensus that
the interest is worthy of protection; the foreseeability of harm and the degree of
certainty that the protected person suffered injury; moral blame society attaches to the
conduct; the prevention of future harm; considerations of cost and ability to spread the
risk of loss; the economic burden upon the actor and the community[;] and others."
Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 257 (citations omitted).
In some cases the duty is deemed to arise as a result of the relationship between
the parties. Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-American Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426,
432 (Mo. 1985). However, foreseeability of harm to the particular plaintiff remains
the dominant factor in determining the existence of a duty on behalf of the defendant.
Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 854.
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a treatment designed specifically to benefit a later conceived child.'76
Furthermore, traditional duty analysis provides a means of denying
preconception claims that are too remote to be reasonably foreseeable at the
time of the negligent conduct. Thus, when a future mother is injured in an
automobile accident, public policy considerations prevent the defendant driver
from being liable to a later conceived child.177
While traditional duty analysis may be used to limit preconception tort
claims involving pharmaceuticals and genetic defects appearing several
generations beyond the negligent act, it becomes much more difficult to
express sound policy reasons for drawing the line anywhere short of a "blanket
no-duty rule.""17 Perhaps these problems are most apparent in the multi-
generational cases involving preconception torts and DES.179 New York
chose to avoid the problem of perpetual and unforeseeable claims by
establishing a "blanket no-duty rule" that has been heavily criticized.80
Other courts (generally considering facts similar to those involving plaintiffs
with EBF) have allowed a cause of action for preconception torts but have
limited the holdings to allow for reconsideration in cases of perpetual
liability."' Thus, the facts of the specific case are an important factor
overshadowing a court's consideration of the underlying policy considerations
required to find a legal duty and recognize a preconception tort cause of
action."l For example, in cases similar to EBF, where the doctor fails to
administer treatment designed to protect the later born plaintiff, the facts
support adoption of a cause of action. In other cases, the facts supporting
recognition of a duty are much less compelling.
176. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 104-25 and accompanying text. The court in Albala
believed that "recognition of a cause of action" would extend "traditional tort concepts
beyond manageable bounds." Albala v. City of New York, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109
(N.Y. 1981).
179. See, e.g., Mascaro, supra note 34, at 435-50.
180. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
181. Renslowv. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977); Walkerv.
Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 596 (Ind. 1992) (recognizing that the legislature would act as
it had in passing the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act if the opinion revived the
medical malpractice crisis in Indiana); Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 854.
182. Determination of duty is a question of law. Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 257.
However, a court is more likely to find the underlying policy considerations necessary
to support a cause of action for preconception torts in a case involving failure to
administer RhoGAM, resulting in development of EBF in a later conceived plaintiff.
The issue then becomes whether a later plaintiff can rely on that precedent in another
type of preconception tort case, such as a DES case involving third generation liability.
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Nearly everyone would agree that the potential for staggering
preconception tort liability in the context of toxic tort and pharmaceutical
litigation calls for some limitation on perpetual liability. 1" While some
courts and commentators indicate traditional duty analysis is sufficient to limit
long liability tails,"M others suggest these claims can best be curtailed by
statutes of limitation,' or other legislative action."86
The majority in Lough appears comfortable with the use of duty analysis
to limit remote preconception torts similar to any other tort cause of
action.1" However, the dissent suggests that the Missouri statute of
limitations should be interpreted to prohibit preconception claims, even in the
context of an EBF case."
Thus, we are left to ponder the value of Lough as precedent for future
preconception tort cases founded on less appealing fact patterns, such as a
third generation DES granddaughter claim."8 9 Missouri courts have been
less aggressive than even the New York courts in expanding recovery for DES
plaintiffs. 1
90
While Lough provides persuasive authority for the proposition that a duty
should extend to the third generation plaintiff, it is unlikely that the Missouri
Supreme Court would reach such a result on the facts of a third generation
DES granddaughter claim."' Although the Missouri statute of limitations,
183. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 854.
185. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 34, at 708; Stoll, supra note 34, at 152
(proposing a three part statute of limitations that (1) excludes the natural parents of the
infant plaintiff as defendants in a cause of action, (2) bars preconception tort actions
five years after the negligent conduct except for medical defendants such as doctors
and hospitals, and (3) limits recovery to the first generation of plaintiffs following the
preconception act).
186. See, e.g., Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 597; Albala, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 111
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
187. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 854.
188. Id. at 856 (Smith, Special J., dissenting).
189. See Mascaro, supra note 34, at 446-50.
190. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241.,247 (Mo. 1984) (refusing to adopt
the "market share liability" concept to allow DES plaintiffs to recover without proof
of the actual manufacturer). The court stated, "[t]here is insufficient justification at
this time to support abandonment of so fundamental a concept of tort law as the
requirement that a plaintiff prove, at a minimum, some nexus betweenwrongdoing and
injury." Id. See generally Mike D. Murphy, Note, Market Share Liability New York
Style: Negligence in the Air?, 55 Mo. L. REv. 1047 (1990) (discussing market share
liability in the context of New York DES cases).
191. E.g., the facts of Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 568 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (N.Y.
1991); see supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
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as interpreted by the majority in Lough, might not prevent perpetual claims,
most certainly the Missouri Supreme Court would find that no duty exists
based on the public policy factors set forth in Hyde" 2 and Lough.193 Such
a result is consistent with both traditional tort principles and the policies
expressed by the commentators." 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Following persuasive authority regarding EBF cases, the Missouri
Supreme Court reached the proper result in Lough, while constraining the
holding to provide judicial limitations to Missouri preconception tort doctrine.
Lough provides a sound doctrine for analyzing each case on its particular
facts. Thus, the case offers precedent for protecting deserving plaintiffs such
as Tyler Lough, while simultaneously protecting the medical community from
remote perpetual liability claims that may arise.
RAYMoND E. WILLIAMS
192. 637 S.W.2d at 257.
193. 866 S.W.2d at 854.
194. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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